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A SYMPOSIUM ON THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
DANIEL W. HAMILTON*
In November 2005, constitutional scholars and legal historians gath-
ered at Chicago-Kent College of Law for a two-day conference to discuss
both Larry Kramer's new book, The People Themselves: Popular Constitu-
tionalism and Judicial Review, 1 and more broadly, the topic of popular
constitutionalism itself. By the time the Symposium began, it was clear that
Kramer's book had struck a nerve. Reviewed in almost every major law
review, and in most major newspapers, 2 The People Themselves has gener-
ated intense discussion concerning the rise of judicial power in the United
States and the role of popular politics in restraining, or failing to restrain,
that power over the course of American history.
In an era of ever-increasing academic specialization, the book tells an
ambitious story that at once takes on several eras of American constitu-
tional history and also modem political and legal debates over judicial re-
view. This broad canvas allows for several simultaneous conversations:
those between historians of different eras, between the law school and the
* Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I want especially to thank Editor-In-Chief
Luke Shannon, Managing Editor Claire Forster, and the Chicago-Kent Law Review for their excellent
work during the Symposium and on the Symposium issue of the Law Review.
1. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2004).
2. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1594 (2005) (book review); Daan Braveman, On Law and Democratic Development: Popular
Constitutionalism and Judicial Supremacy, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 41 (2005); Erwin
Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1013
(2004); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Bringing the People Back In, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 653 (2005) (book re-
view); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Suprem-
acy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (2004); L. A. Powe, Jr., Are "the People " Missing in Action (and Should
Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 855 (2005) (book review); Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against
Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH L. REV. 1539 (2005) (book review); Symposium, Theories of Taking
the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341 (2005); Norman R. Williams,
The People's Constitution, 57 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2004) (book review); Laurence H. Tribe, The Peo-
ple's Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, § 7, at 32; Larry D. Kramer, Letter to the Editor, Kramer vs.
Tribe, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Nov. 21, 2004, at 6; John 0. McGinis, Whose Constitution Is It, Any-
way? Judicial Review Has Its Limits, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2004, at D8.
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rest of the university, and, rarest of all, between an academic and a popular
audience. Of course not everyone agrees with this provocative book,3 but
we can be certain that it can bear the weight of genuine inter-disciplinary
discussion over the meaning and importance of popular constitutionalism.
In coming to grips with popular constitutionalism and with The People
Themselves, the Symposium's papers and presentations asked new ques-
tions of constitutional history, constitutional theory, and the relationship
between the two. Historians at the Symposium considered popular constitu-
tionalism in several different eras, using The People Themselves as a jump-
ing-off point for a reconsideration of some of the great questions of
American constitutional history. Morton Horwitz in his keynote address,
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Gerald Leonard, and Richard Ross all consider popu-
lar constitutionalism in early American history, and in particular the way
popular constitutionalism complicates the traditional story of the rise of
judicial review in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 4 Saul
Cornell explores how the "Whiskey Rebellion" can be understood as an
assertion of the "right of revolution" and an early instance of popular con-
stitutionalism in action.5
Keith Whittington considers popular constitutionalism in the antebel-
lum era, and in particular in the rise of the party system. 6 He concludes that
"Kramer's positive account of the rise of judicial supremacy" is "inaccu-
rate, both in terms of its political analysis and as a matter of history." 7 In-
stead, Whittington argues, "political parties are deeply implicated in the
political dynamic that gives rise to judicial supremacy."'8 Mark Graber and
Daniel Hamilton take the story forward to the era of the Civil War, asking
how popular constitutionalism might reorient our view on the constitutional
thought of Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas and the making of con-
stitutional interpretation during the war.9 William Forbath takes the history
3. See, e.g., Powe, supra note 2.
4. See Morton J. Horwitz, A Historiography of the People Themselves and Popular Constitution-
alism, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 813 (2006); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Discrete and Cosmopolitan Minor-
ity: The Loyalists, the Atlantic World, and the Origins of Judicial Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 825
(2006); Gerald Leonard, Iredell Reclaimed: A Critique of Snowiss's History of Judicial Review, 81
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 867 (2006); Richard J. Ross, Pre-Revolutionary Popular Constitutionalism and
Larry Kramer's The People Themselves, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 905 (2006).
5. Saul Cornell, Mobs, Militias, and Magistrates: Popular Constitutionalism and the Whiskey
Rebellion, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 883 (2006).
6. Keith E. Whittington, Give "The People" What They Want?, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 911
(2006).
7. Id. at 913.
8. Id.
9. Mark A. Graber, Popular Constitutionalism, Judicial Supremacy, and the Complete Lincoln-
Douglas Debates, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 923 (2006); Daniel W. Hamilton, Popular Constitutionalism
in the Civil War: A Trial Run, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 953 (2006).
[Vol 81:809
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of popular constitutionalism still further into Progressive Era battles over
the Constitution, an era which is for Forbath, "the first and last time Ameri-
cans seriously considered profound institutional changes aimed at enlarging
ordinary citizens' role in determining the meaning of the Constitution and
the course of its development."' 10
Two pieces consider the historiography of popular constitutionalism
and the methodology of The People Themselves. Mark Tushnet examines
the way the study of popular constitutionalism contributes to "the idea of
constitutional law as political law," simultaneously a species of "hard" law
and also a series of "constitutional arguments by the people themselves,
independent of and sometimes in acknowledged conflict with, constitu-
tional interpretations offered and enforced by courts."'11 Christopher
Tomlins places the book in the context of the historiography of the Consti-
tution and examines what the book reveals about "the history of profes-
sional history in the United States." and the "production of legitimacy for
all manner of constitutive practices."' 12
Constitutional and comparative scholars at the Symposium similarly
examine popular constitutionalism and Kramer's book from a variety of
angles. Papers by Frank Michelman and Sarah Harding situate popular
constitutionalism within the context of legal theory. Michelman examines
the role popular constitutionalism plays in the larger debate over "the no-
tion of the Constitution as popular-not-ordinary law" by probing the rela-
tionship of popular constitutionalism and the "doubtful case rule.' 13
Harding considers the normative arguments implicit in popular constitu-
tionalism and in particular how Kramer's arguments about judicial review
fit within theoretical discussions over the meaning of disagreement and its
institutional manifestations, within American constitutionalism and within
a comparative perspective. 14
Two papers by constitutional law professors are somewhat ambivalent
about the place of popular constitutionalism within a modem interpretive
regime. Neal Devins and David Franklin express concern that popular con-
10. William E. Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth Century: Reflections on the
Dark Side, the Progressive Constitutional Imagination, and the Enduring Role of Judicial Finality in
Popular Understandings of Popular Self-Rule, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 967, 967 (2006).
11. Mark Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 991, 991
(2006).
12. Christopher Tomlins, Politics, Police, Past and Present: Larry Kramer's The People Them-
selves, 81 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1007, 1008 (2006).
13. Frank 1. Michelman, Comment: Popular Law and the Doubtful Case Rule, 81 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1109, 1109 (2006).
14. Sarah Harding, Kramer's Popular Constitutionalism: A Quick Normative Assessment, 81 CI.-
KENT L. REV. 1117 (2006).
2006]
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stitutionalism is difficult, if not impossible, both to locate and to measure. 15
Is popular will reflected in the political branches of the government, and, if
not, how can we begin to interpret or apply popular constitutionalism?
Robin West, Theodore Ruger, and Sheldon Nahmod are more sympa-
thetic to the potential legal and social benefits of at least a partial embrace
of popular constitutionalism. For Nahmod, popular constitutionalism might
have the promise of reinvigorating public debate, or at least public under-
standing, of the Constitution and the ever-increasing power of the courts in
American political life. 16 Ruger explores how popular constitutionalism
might work in "ordinary lawmaking" and specifically its potential impact
on interpretation of the commerce clause and the limits of congressional
power, in particular providing a new set of arguments for judicial re-
straint. 17 West examines popular constitutionalism as potentially powerful
new vision of the Constitution, allowing for a return to arguments before
the courts and in public discourse that the Constitution contains affirmative
obligations to "ensure that all citizens enjoy those basic capabilities neces-
sary to lead a decent life."' 18
At the Symposium, and in the intense debate over The People Them-
selves elsewhere, popular constitutionalism was considered as a powerful,
new synthetic concept to many, and as somewhat elusive-and even poten-
tially dangerous-to others. It is not yet clear whether popular constitution-
alism will survive as a more-or-less discrete historical phenomenon or
ideology, capable of definition, or whether it is best considered as a vessel
for a more general set of questions about alternative visions of the Consti-
tution and its relationship to popular social and political movements. If the
outcome is not certain, the debate is fruitful. We hope you enjoy the pieces
that follow.
15. Neal Devins, Tom DeLay: Popular Constitutionalist?, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1055 (2006);
David L. Franklin, Popular Constitutionalism as Presidential Constitutionalism?, 81 CHI-KENT L.
REv. 1069 (2006).
16. Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional Education for The People Themselves, 81 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 1091 (2006).
17. Theodore W. Ruger, Preempting the People: The Judicial Role in Regulatory Concurrency
and Its Implications for Popular Lawmaking, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1029 (2006).
18. Robin West, Katrina, the Constitution, and the Legal Question Doctrine, 81 CHi.-KENT L.
REv. 1127, 1128 (2006).
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